





























RF: How did you become interested in looking at the arts
from an economic perspective?
Cowen: When I first started learning about economics in the
1970s, economic conditions were very bad. We had sluggish
growth and high inflation. My early work tended to focus on
macroeconomic and monetary questions because they seemed
very pressing and important. But for the past 20 years, macro-
economic conditions generally have been good, and the
policies pursued by the country’s central bankers have
improved a great deal. This, obviously, is wonderful. But, in a
sense, it has made those fields much duller. Don’t get me
wrong: I don’t think all the key problems and questions have
been solved, but their policy relevance has become less pressing.
My professional interest in the arts began to emerge about
15 years ago when I spent some time in New Zealand. Their
central bank had one of the first versions of inflation targeting,
and I was hired as a consultant to come in and look at that.
While I was there, I realized that I didn’t want to do just
money and macro. So I started thinking about some of the
niche areas in microeconomics. One of these was the arts. I
thought that this was an area that had been underexplored and
People generally agree that markets are the most
efficient way to allocate resources. In short, they
deliver the goods. One exception, some critics say,
is culture. Markets respond to mass demand and,
as a result, produce inferior, homogenized art.
Consider movies. Hollywood makes plenty of 
special effects laden blockbusters but neglects
thoughtful dramas and documentaries.
You might be tempted to dismiss such arguments
as mere snobbery. After all, a lot of this criticism
boils down to one person wishing to substitute his
own (supposedly refined) preferences for another’s
(supposedly gauche) tastes. But there is a larger
point to be made, says Tyler Cowen, an economist
at George Mason University. We don’t live in an
either-or world. Many different types and forms 
of art can — and, in fact, do — peacefully coexist.
Markets cater to a multiplicity of wants, and
nowhere is this more apparent than in the United
States. To borrow from the title of his forthcoming
book, we live in a world of both good and plenty.
Cowen started his academic career largely pursuing
topics in monetary economics. But his interests
have always been eclectic, and in the early 1990s, 
he began to shift his attention toward the economics
of culture. The result has been a string of books and
papers that examine the current state of the arts
and the conditions under which they flourish. In
addition, since 2003, he and his colleague Alexander
Tabarrok have maintained one of the most 
popular economics blogs, marginalrevolution.com. 
Aaron Steelman interviewed Cowen on the George
Mason campus in Fairfax, Va., on November 21, 2005.
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RF Winter2006 v6.ps - 2/8/2006 12:16 PMwhere I had some original things to say. I started my work on
the topic around 1990. The output came quite a bit later
because there was a lot of work involved, more than just doing
conventional economics. I spent five or six years writing my
first book in the area, In Praise of Commercial Culture, and from
there my next few book projects became pretty clear. They
were just extensions of that first book. In fact, much of their
content came from chapters that had been cut from the 
original manuscript of the first book.
RF: What are your thoughts on the “cost disease” as it
relates to the arts?
Cowen: In the mid-1960s, William Baumol and William
Bowen advanced the hypothesis that the arts would experience
lower productivity gains than other sectors of the economy, and
therefore would suffer from the “cost disease.” The analysis gets
a little complicated, but one thing I have tried to argue is that
the initial assumption that productivity gains would be low 
simply isn’t true. If you look at music, in the last century we
have seen the introduction of radio, compact discs, and now
MP3 files. In addition, it’s easier than ever to order music
through places like Amazon, and it’s cheaper to sample many
different types of music. Also, the reduced cost of travel has
made it more affordable to go to concerts and experience live
music. So I think the cost of consuming music has fallen 
dramatically, and people enjoy much more music in a much
more comfortable way than they did in the past. 
Consider how people consumed music throughout most of
the 19th century. There were no recordings until the latter part
of the century — and the recordings that were available were
much more expensive than they are today. Instead, people had
to travel by wagon, often for many hours, to see a live perform-
ance. And when they got there, the acoustics often weren’t very
good. It was simply very difficult to listen to music. So I think
that the premise of the argument made by Baumol and Bowen
has been overstated. Some subsectors will experience a lower
than average rate of productivity growth. But, on balance, there
is plenty of room for the arts to reap productivity gains, and we
have seen it time and again. 
RF: Looking at the music industry today, we see that while
the cost of traveling to concerts has been going down over
time, the cost of concert tickets has been going up. Are
artists trying to make up some of the revenue they are 
losing through illegal downloading of their studio albums
by raising the price of attending a live show?  
Cowen: Yes, I think so. The people who download illegally
tend to be younger listeners. That means you are left with a
market of older listeners, richer listeners, and less price-elastic
listeners. So for concerts and some CDs, the cost will go up.
I think we have moved from a regime where de facto copy-
right enforcement was too strict to one where it is too relaxed.
Illegal downloading, in one form or another, will continue.
Lawsuits will put a dent in it, but it won’t fundamentally stop it.
As a result, commercial music won’t dry up, but some margins
will get squeezed. World music will do just fine. Jazz will do just
fine. And classical will do just fine. The average listener of those
types of music is going to purchase it, not download it illegally. 
But if you think about popular music, there is one segment
that I think will be hurt: musicians with moderate-size fan
bases whose work requires a lot of studio time. It will be very
hard for them to recoup their production costs. Popular groups
that don’t spend much time in the studio will do fine. They
don’t require a lot of capital, and they earn a lot of their money
from touring anyway. And the huge superstars, like Madonna or
Eminem, will be fine also. Their CDs will sell because there’s a
fraction of the population that will always want to be part of the
club, so to speak. So, as I said, I don’t think illegal downloading
will mean the end of commercial music. But some segments of
the market will be hurt quite badly.
RF: People who support the National Endowment for the
Arts (NEA) and the National Endowment for the
Humanities (NEH) claim these agencies are necessary to
remedy market failures that are present in the arts. What
do you think of that argument?
Cowen: I think that the American way of subsidizing the arts
has mostly been indirect, through the tax treatment of non-
profit organizations, through the public funding of universities,
through copyright laws. Those policies have done quite a bit to
remedy the market failure problems that do, in fact, exist in the
arts. But direct subsidies have not been at the forefront of the
approach. And those direct subsidies, in purely quantitative
terms, are very small.
I think the more important issue is how tax reform would
affect nonprofits and the arts. To me, that’s a more fruitful
debate than how the NEA should spend its money. For
instance, the President’s tax commission came up with a 
proposal to reduce tax deductions for some kinds of nonprofit
organizations. In my view, that would be a mistake. I have a
Tocquevillean sympathy for the proliferation of intermediate
institutions which we call American civil society. I think the
strength of those institutions enables us to get by with less 
government intervention than many other developed nations.
So in the long run, if we moved to a truly flat tax system that
removed the favorable tax treatment for nonprofits, I think we
would harm the decentralized production of ideas and art. 
RF: I would like to consider the issue of market failure
more broadly. How widespread, in your view, are examples
of market failure? And have economists who generally
favor a hands-off approach to public policy not adequately
addressed those cases where market failure arguments 
are plausible?  
Cowen: I believe market failures are virtually everywhere. The
key question is comparative: Where will government do better?
I think of myself as a libertarian, and compared to public opin-
ion as a whole, my views certainly are libertarian. But the case
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for the market is empirical, and I think that there are plenty of
cases where it is desirable for the government to do something.
One example is the avian flu, which I hope we will get to later. I
also think, though, that there are many cases of market failure
where the government shouldn’t do anything. In principle, we
could come up with programs that would improve social 
welfare, but in practice those programs would be difficult to
implement effectively. Also, I think there is a good argument for
the notion that a government can do only a limited number of
things well. In the big picture, you have to choose priorities, and
that means you have to let some share of market failures slide.
RF: Please tell us about your next book, Good and Plenty.
Cowen: The book is coming out in the spring from Princeton.
In it I attempt to unify the economic perspectives on the issue
of art with the aesthetic perspectives, and to ask what are the
types of policies that would produce a system of artistic 
production that is both efficient and aesthetically pleasing. I
argue that the American system, to a considerable degree, does
that. It is not perfect on either dimension. But on the two taken
together, I think it does better than any other. In one sense,
then, the book is a defense of and apology for the American 
system. And in another sense, it’s a return to the classic social
science question of how America and Europe relate to each
other, and what are their relative virtues and drawbacks.
RF: Is there a real danger that globalization will lead to
the effective loss of some cultures’ most important and
distinguishing characteristics? And if so, is this something
that we should worry about?
Cowen:There are plenty of cases of small, indigenous cultures
using the market to make a living without people having to
migrate to big cities. That being said, I think it’s true that some
very small cultures — their language is spoken by 50,000 people
or fewer, they have their own tribal rituals, etc. — are, in fact,
disappearing. But I think they are disappearing largely for good
reasons. People want jobs, access to antibiotics, and better
schools for their children, so they move to urban areas.
However, those people are not completely abandoning their
identities or ceasing to be creative. They are blending with their
new cultures, rather than being overtaken by them. We see this
in places like Mexico, Brazil, and Nigeria, where people 
are moving from rural to urban areas. This process, by itself,
doesn’t bother me, as long as it is being driven by economic
growth. I think it’s hard to dismiss people’s desires to improve
their own lives and the lives of their children, and for many, this
is what moving to cities means. 
RF: Your last answer suggests that it is sometimes difficult
to divorce normative concerns from positive economic
analysis. What do you think is the proper role for 
normative evaluations in economics?
Cowen:I don’t think we have ever had a good welfare economics.
When you think of
Paretian theory, it’s very
useful, but we never have
been able to explain to
the common man or 
to philosophers why 
efficiency should be the
only relevant value. As
economists, we have
taken a real beating on
this, time and again, and





Dworkin in the early
1980s, I think it’s pretty
clear that Dworkin got the better of that exchange, yet econo-
mists are still looking at wealth maximization. 
So I think there are a lot of interesting normative issues in
economics. I’m not sure we will ever have definitive answers,
but I think we should be willing to entertain more values than
what is possible by doing simple Paretian analysis. This is impor-
tant for its own sake, but I think it would also help us
understand why economic recommendations are often found to
be unpersuasive. In my work on the economics of the arts, I
have come across this all the time. Most people don’t accept the
efficiency argument at all. They want art for art’s sake. I would
like to think that we have some way of speaking to people like
that and developing a common language. And I think that 
a good system for the arts would do well on both economic 
criteria and aesthetic criteria.
RF: Why do you think so many people object to the way
economists think about rationality?
Cowen: Well, I think there is some blame on both sides 
here. Economic models of rationality are centered around self-
interest. It’s true that you can factor in altruism in these models
to some extent, but the self-interest idea remains paramount.
And that may not be entirely realistic. But I also think that
many people don’t like these models because they strip away a
veneer of self-deception. You often hear the claim that various
social phenomena are so complex that they can’t be explained
by mere self-interest. Perhaps, but I think that is a way of
whitewashing some very unpleasant things that go on in society.
RF: You clearly have a significant interest in cuisine. And
many people clearly value your opinions on the topic —
your “Ethnic Dining Guide to the Washington, D.C. Area”
is now in its 19th edition. How can economics help us
understand food and the way people eat? 
Cowen: This relates to my work on globalization and culture
more generally, which asks the question: Does greater trade,
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investment, and migration across bor-
ders give us more or less diversity? And
a great deal of those debates are about
food. For instance, you see a great
many people who are upset about
McDonald’s and Pizza Hut establish-
ing restaurants around the world. So
my attention was drawn to the food
area, and I think from an economic
standpoint, it offers a case study of the
diffusion of innovation. 
Why is barbecue in Lockhart,
Texas, so much better than barbecue in
Fairfax, Virginia? The answer is not
immediately obvious. One would
think that there is considerable
demand in both areas, yet the markets
are very different. In part, I think it
has to do with the spread of social 
customs and regional identity. And, in
part, I think it has to do with differing
legal and regulatory structures; for
instance, Lockhart’s barbecue estab-
lishments would not meet the fire,
health, and safety codes that exist in
many areas, including Fairfax. Also,
why do some types of food lend them-
selves to chain establishments while
others do not? For example, most
doughnut shops now are part of
chains, but barbecue chains generally
haven’t done very well. To understand
that question, you need a fair amount of economics. So what I
hope to do with my work in this area is to use food as a vehicle
for discussing larger economic truths, and to reach an audience
of people who might read books about food, but not necessarily
books about economics.
RF: Some people have argued that globalization will
induce more countries to adopt the type of “neoliberal”
policies that characterize the United States, and abandon a
more interventionist approach. How has your work on
globalization led you to think about that issue?
Cowen: I don’t necessarily agree. My prediction is that, in 
general, welfare states will increase in size in most places
around the world. We can expect most areas of the world to
become wealthier because of globalization as well as other 
reasons. And if you look at countries that are wealthy, they tend
to have very generous welfare states. Also, I believe that the
human desire for security is extremely strong, even when it is
not efficient or rational. So as long as we experience economic
growth, I think we can expect welfare states to grow. 
RF: If the process you described in your previous answer is
correct, what does that mean for economists who favor a
less interventionist, more market-
oriented approach to social policy?
Do their arguments become futile?
Cowen: I don’t think so. Free-market
economists are unlikely to see their
most preferred policies enacted. But
their work can help slow down or even
stop very bad ideas from becoming
policy. So their arguments do matter.
That’s important. Still, there is a
broader issue here. As social scientists,
our foremost concern should be trying
to understand the world. That means
asking and perhaps answering very
hard questions. Trying to convince the
public — and especially trying to get
people to march in lock step — should
be a secondary concern.
Having said that, I don’t want to
give the impression that academics
should look only to the frontiers of
their disciplines. For instance, the
work being done in economics now
is very rigorous and very good. But 
if I have one criticism of the 
profession, it’s that there is too
much emphasis on doing highly 
specialized research and not enough
emphasis on consuming what is
already out there. Most of us could
benefit a great deal from a better
understanding of work that has already been done.
RF: You wrote a paper called “Why Only Nixon Can Go to
China” that was published in Public Choice. Can you talk
about that paper and some more recent applications where
the argument is relevant?
Cowen: The basic premise of that paper is that it often requires
a politician who is believed by the public to be tough on a 
particular policy to make a significant change in that policy. In
short, Nixon was able to open diplomatic relations with China
because he was seen as such a staunch anticommunist. But
George McGovern would have had a hard time doing the same
thing because his anticommunist credentials were not as strong.
We see a similar thing happening now with fiscal policy. The
Republicans campaigned on a platform of fiscal austerity. But
even on domestic discretionary items, they have been spending
through the roof. There are two possible mechanisms by which
this can happen. One is a signaling argument. If the party that
you think ought to naturally oppose a policy instead supports it,
some people will think that it must be really important and that
we must really need it. 
The second is an interest-group argument. If you think of
parties on each side of the spectrum as having natural interest
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Street — then the party and the interest group have a long,
ongoing relationship, and the interest group is going to be
reluctant to break it. So even though the Republicans’ interest
groups might oppose increased federal spending, they are going
to tend to stay quiet, but if Democrats were in power, they
would scream bloody murder. The
same thing is true on the Democratic
side. Clinton was basically for free
trade and fiscal restraint, and he was
fairly moderate on regulation. Many
Democratic interest groups didn’t
like those policies, but they weren’t
particularly vocal in opposition
because they felt they had no place
else to go.
RF: Please tell us about your debate with David Friedman
over the economics of a stateless society.
Cowen: David Friedman wrote a book called The Machinery of
Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, which is very stimulating.
He makes the claim that all services — including police, courts,
and final adjudication — could be privatized. I’m skeptical that
this would work. I’m willing, for the purposes of argument, to
accept Friedman’s claim that it would have a certain stability. But
I think that the final level of adjudication is a type of natural
monopoly. Once you imagine these private insurance and 
protection companies collectively making deals, it’s a short step
from that to widespread collusion, and you would be back to gov-
ernment. So what I tried to do was to give the anarcho-capitalist
argument its fairest hearing, but even then I don’t think it would
work. I believe you would quickly wind up with government
again, so I think of government as a constraint, not a choice.
Also, when you look at places without government, they
tend to have many undesirable characteristics. Think of
Somalia. Friedman, of course, would point to other examples,
like medieval Iceland. But those examples don’t show what 
he believes they show. There is a critical watershed in the 
developed world in the late 19th century. For the first time you
get large institutional structures — in particular, big business
and big government. Medieval Iceland did work fairly well, but
it didn’t have large-scale structures. So to say that it didn’t have
government I view as a correlate with the fact that it didn’t have
a lot of other things either. To think that system would work in
the post-1870 world, I believe, is just not true. You might begin
in a world without government, but things would quickly
evolve so that government would be present.  
RF: Why did you and Alex Tabarrok decide to launch 
marginalrevolution.com? What have been some of the
principal benefits of maintaining the blog? And what, if
any, have been the downsides? 
Cowen: It has been about two years and three months since
Alex and I launched marginalrevolution. At the time it seemed
clear to us that blogging would become important, but there
was very little in the way of economic blogging. Even now, there
are relatively few economic blogs compared to many other
areas. We thought this would be an opportunity for us to jump
in and help define what economic blogging would be. It would
be educational, but it also would be fun. And unlike a lot of blog-
ging, it wouldn’t consist of personal
attacks or partisan politics. Instead,
we would try to push the frontiers of
how we think about economic issues
and see how well that could be 
communicated in this new medium. 
It’s gone very well for us. We
have found an audience, and 
judging by the comments we
receive, a well-informed, thoughtful
audience. It’s given us a way of 
communicating to people who we couldn’t have reached any
other way. And I think I have learned more working on the
blog than I would have with any other use of the time. The
success of the blog actually makes me nervous. I get up every
morning and wonder who is going to read us. In a way, that has
a disciplining effect — it makes you think hard about an issue
before writing about it, rather than just throwing down your
first thoughts on a topic.
RF: As a senior faculty member, how would you advise a
more junior colleague who is considering starting a blog?
Cowen: I wouldn’t necessarily discourage blogging. My guess is
that junior faculty who end up blogging get more research done
than those who don’t. But that’s not because of the blog per se.
Rather, it’s because those people are probably more ambitious
and have more fertile ideas than the typical junior faculty 
member. So, on average, they would have been high producers
anyway, and the blog simply complements their scientific work. 
That said, I think that academics who blog have more of a
generalist approach to their work than those who don’t. Their
professional interests usually are not in highly arcane, technical
areas, but in fields with more general applicability. And insofar
as there is an antigeneralist bias in the modern academic world
— and I think there is — bloggers tend to suffer. There is a
recent high-profile case of a blogger who was denied tenure
that I think is consistent with this argument. His professional
work was, by most accounts, very good and the volume was 
certainly large, but he didn’t mine a narrow field over and over
again. That was probably a more important factor than the
blog in his tenure decision. 
RF: You have written quite a bit about the avian flu.
What is the potential magnitude of that problem? And
what, in your opinion, should policymakers do — and not
do — in response?
Cowen: Right now, there is more H5N1, a particularly 
dangerous strain of avian flu, in more birds in more parts of the
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catching H5N1 from birds, especially in southeast Asia. So it’s
already a serious problem. In the countries where the disease is
most widespread, the poultry industry is very important, and
most people are exposed to birds regularly. It’s a major health
issue. But the even bigger danger is that the virus mutates so that
it’s transmitted from one human being to another. We’re not sure
what kind of mutation would be required for human-to-human
transmission, or how likely that is, so we don’t know the 
probability of there being a pandemic.
It’s believed that the 1918 flu virus — which was a form of
avian flu — killed 50 to 100 million people worldwide.
Transportation is much better now and people move around the
world with much more ease, so it’s possible that the virus could
spread more quickly. And even though the world has much 
better health care, if there was a surge of demand for services,
most people would not be helped, especially in relatively poor
countries with large populations, such as China and India. So
there’s potential for catastrophe. 
The question of what we should do is difficult. We don’t have
many good remedies at our disposal in the short run. Most of 
our vaccines now come from abroad, but in a pandemic they
wouldn’t be exported. So we would be at loose ends. In the long
run, we should do more to help the vaccine industry. When it
comes to antiviral drugs and vaccines I would argue that we
should protect rather than confiscate intellectual property. I
would buy the vaccines using government money at a favorable
price, because if the government just seized them, companies
would have little reason to produce them the next time around. 
In the short run, the best we can do is to have well-function-
ing local health care institutions, especially emergency rooms
with good backup plans. Let’s say your emergency room is
booked up with people who have already contracted the flu.
How do you deal with everyone else? Should they stay at home?
Do they get sent to another part of the hospital? We are starting
to do planning, but we are very much behind. 
There are many proposals that put a lot of faith in building up
a stockpile of the vaccine. I’m not saying we shouldn’t do that,
but I think it’s probably overrated. If a pandemic came, the
chance that the stockpile would be allocated efficiently and in
time is small. Also, some people have called for quarantines, but
that wouldn’t work in a country like the United States. When 
discussing this, I think it’s important to distinguish between
“isolating” and “quarantining” people. Isolation would mean
keeping an infected person in a different wing of the hospital. I
think that makes sense. Quarantine is when you try to close off a
particular area — all traffic, commerce, movement — usually
through the use of the military. But if a pandemic came, it would
hit virtually every major city in the country at the same time. It
would be so geographically dispersed that quarantines would be
futile. Also, there’s the simple question of where you draw the
line. Consider Fairfax. Is it Route 236? Is it I-95? Is it the Beltway?
You don’t know how far it has spread, so the line is arbitrary.
So the bottom line, I think, is that we need to have some
humility. If a pandemic occurred soon — and, as I said, no one
knows the probability of this occurring — we would be in real
trouble. There is no magic bullet. But we can use economics to
help us prepare for the long run, so that in, say, 10 years, we would
be in a better position to deal with this problem. Also, some of
the things that I mentioned we could do in the short run — such
as improve our local health care institutions — would help us
deal with any catastrophe, including another terrorist attack. 
So that would pay off whether or not there is an avian 
flu pandemic. 
RF: George Mason has a reputation of being perhaps the
most market-oriented Ph.D. granting department in the
country. Please tell us a little bit about the series of events
that led to the department’s current complexion.
Cowen: Jim Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and the Center for
the Study of Public Choice came here in 1983. That was a 
big group all at once. And obviously the people who recruited
them — which included some economists who were 
sympathetic to the Austrian School — liked the work they
were doing. Then a few years ago, Vernon Smith and his 
colleagues doing research in experimental economics arrived.
So you had three groups of economists — the Public
Choicers, the Austrians, and the experimentalists — who
were all pretty friendly to a market-oriented approach to 
economics. In the meantime, both our department and the
law school began to attract a number of people who were
interested in doing law-and-economics work. So there were
some cluster effects, I think. Academics benefit from being
around people who share similar research programs, and we
have seen that happen at George Mason.
RF: Early in your career, you tended to publish mostly in
journals, many of them quite prestigious, but most of your
work recently has appeared in book form. Has this been a
deliberate choice?
Cowen: Yes. I think journals have become less receptive to “big
idea” papers that can spark a serious debate and literature, 
and more inclined to publish papers that make incremental
contributions to an existing literature. There is certainly value
in the latter type of work, but it interests me less now. 
There is also something about writing a book, where 
you live with a topic for several years, that I find personally
attractive and exciting. If there is something that I am really
interested in, I don’t want to let go of it until I have been able
to say what I want about it. With papers, you can do follow-ups,
but they just are gone too quickly for my satisfaction.
RF: Which economists have influenced you the most? 
Cowen: Hayek influenced me from a very early age. Thomas
Schelling was a mentor of mine in graduate school. And my 
colleagues have been extremely influential. We have very 
stimulating conversations every day. Also, I would say that 
reading broadly in philosophy, fiction, and other areas outside
of economics has influenced my thinking and my work. RF
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